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 TITLE:  
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ABSTRACT 
Performance appraisal interviews remain central to how employees are scrutinised, 
rewarded and sometimes penalized by managers. But they are also often castigated as 
ineffective, or even harmful, to both individuals and organizations. Exploring this paradox, we 
highlight the influence of agency theory on the (mal)practice of performance appraisal. The 
performative nature of HRM increasingly reflects an economic approach within which its 
practises are aligned with agency theory. Such theory assumes that actors are motivated mainly 
or only by economic self-interest. Close surveillance is required to eliminate the risk of shirking 
and other deviant behaviours. It is a pessimistic mind-set about people that undermines the 
supportive, co-operative and developmental rhetoric with which appraisal interviews are 
usually accompanied. Consequently, managers often practice appraisal interviews while 
holding onto two contradictory mind-sets, a state of Orwellian Doublethink that damages 
individual learning and organizational performance. We encourage researchers to adopt a more 
radical critique of appraisal practices that foregrounds issues of power, control and conflicted 
interests between actors beyond the analyses offered to date. 




In an influential paper published posthumously in 2005, Sumantra Ghoshal argued that 
what he termed ‘bad’ theories were wreaking havoc on management practice. His argument 
was focused with particular force on agency theory. In Ghoshal’s view, this had produced a 
preoccupation with self-interest among managers who then engaged in behaviours inimical to 
their organizations’ long term interests. Immediate support came from leading management 
thinker Jeffrey Pfeffer (2005), who argued that the bad theories in question become self-
fulfilling. That is, business schools teach them as though their empirical basis were much 
sounder than it is, students emerge with an enriched theoretical lexicon but a diminished sense 
of social responsibility, and poor management practices become institutionalised to such an 
extent that, although they fail to deliver on their original intentions, they become naturalised 
and therefore are assumed to be beyond interrogation (see also Ferraro et al, 2005).  
Consistent with this critical approach, we argue that many of the problems associated 
with performance appraisal can be explained by the wider influence that agency theory has had 
in organizations. To be clear, it is not our intention to suggest that all problems with appraisal 
can be explained in this manner1. Nor do we deny that many employees and managers find 
appraisals to be a positive experience – for example, when there is a high degree of employee 
participation in the process (Roberts, 2003). However, our focus is on those instances where 
negative outcomes are the norm. In exploring why this is the case we argue that agency theory 
has had a significant and often harmful impact on management learning and practice.  
We discuss the nature of agency theory throughout this paper. Here, we simply note its 
foundational assumption that ‘there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and 
                                                          
1 For example, many of the criticisms of appraisal interviews focus on the perceptual biases that people bring to 
them. These include the halo error, the crony effect, the doppelganger effect and the Veblen effect. They are 
discussed by Grint (1993) and Roberson et al (2007), among many others. We do not suggest that these problems 
can be explained primarily by the influence of agency theory. 
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those of managers diverge. In those circumstances… managers may be able to extract higher 
rents than would otherwise be accorded them by owners of the firm’ (Dalton et al, 2007: 2). 
Agency theory therefore explores how firms can ensure an alignment of interests between the 
principal (owners) and agents (employees). It is assumed that people are motivated by self-
interest, mainly or exclusively in the form of economic calculations that over-ride such issues 
as trust, loyalty, and friendship networks (Besley and Ghatak, 2005).  
We argue that the theory’s influence on the practice of appraisal deserves more serious 
attention than it has so far received. We focus on this since the manager-employee appraisal 
process remains a widely used mechanism for performance management in most organizations 
(CIPD, 2009). Researchers have identified many problems associated with how they are 
implemented. It is therefore not surprising that much research has focused on ‘improving’ the 
process of performance appraisal. However, this stresses the psychological rather than 
contextual/ ideological aspects of dysfunctional appraisals (Ilgen and Favero, 1985). It depicts 
appraisers as suffering from biases in their perceptions of others, lacking in feedback skills, 
poor at listening, too wedded to appraisal forms, insufficiently wedded to appraisal forms, 
inclined to offer feedback too frequently or too infrequently, or as otherwise deficient in some 
toolkit that it is assumed will improve their practice. But this research lacks a deeper 
understanding of the root causes of the problems it addresses, and avoids a critical engagement 
more generally with management theory. To address these deficits we explore the problems of 
performance appraisal systems in the context of the wide ranging influence of agency theory.  
Thus, our argument, and contribution, is as follows. Firstly, we briefly discuss both the 
‘positive’ intentions of performance appraisals, and some of the most pressing problems 
associated with it that have been widely identified in the literature. Secondly, we consider the 
wide-ranging influence of agency theory and argue that, as a result, an agency induced mind-
set often impacts on the practice of appraisal. We argue that this undermines the developmental 
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intentions of performance appraisals that are regularly espoused by many researchers, 
consultants and managers.  
Consequently, we suggest that the incremental approach of most research into appraisal, 
which focuses on its (limited) effectiveness, empirically explores incidental aspects of its 
operation and postulates minor adjustments that will purportedly ‘improve’ its utility are 
misplaced2. These approaches encourage managers to keep on adopting it. The view seems to 
advance through the stages of: it should work, it might work, it will work (eventually) – if only 
we correct this or that detail. This begs a question posed by Metz (1988: 47) that could equally 
well be asked today: ‘why, in the constant process of appraisal systems revisions, can’t we 
seem to get it right?’ An obvious answer might be that no one can get it ‘right’, and that a more 
critical engagement with the practice of appraisal is required. We therefore argue that research 
needs to reject the neo-human relations tradition that has dominated much of the research on 
performance appraisal. In contrast, we advocate a critique that problematizes issues of power, 
control and conflicts of interest beyond what such analyses have offered to date. 
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS – GOOD INTENTIONS VERSUS BAD OUTCOMES 
It has been claimed that performance appraisal brings a multitude of benefits to 
organizations and their employees. These include: the opportunity to ensure that staff pursue 
goals that are aligned with the wider organizational objectives set by senior managers; the 
provision of objective assessment and regular feedback, which it is assumed will improve 
learning; heightened commitment and motivation; improved career management though the 
identification of training and development needs; the creation of legal documentation for use 
in cases of discrimination, grievance and disciplinary processes or wrongful dismissal; an 
improved correlation between the wages bill and organizational performance, through linking 
                                                          
2 See contributors to Bennett et al (2006), for many typically ingenuous attempts to do precisely this.  
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appraisal to performance related pay; and, an overall increase in performance (Nikols, 2007). 
Many more such claims can be found in the literature. 
Paradoxically, performance appraisal is also widely viewed as one of the most 
persistent problems faced by both managers and employees. Concern goes back almost sixty 
years, when McGregor (1957) published an article in Harvard Business Review entitled ‘An 
uneasy look at performance appraisal.’ It is often viewed as an annual fiasco that some have 
suggested should be abolished altogether (e.g. Coens and Jenkins, 2000). One major review of 
the area has concluded that there is in fact no evidence as yet to connect individual appraisals 
with firm level improvements in performance (DiNisi et al, 2014). Given the huge volume of 
research on the topic, much of it practitioner oriented, this is quite remarkable. There can be 
few other examples of something that promises so much, delivers so little, but which is so 
universally applied – an observation made long ago by Grint (1993). 
One of the central foci of HRM has been how effectively approaches to people 
management supports the overall business strategy of organizations (Martin et al, 2016). When 
those strategies are dominated by agency perspectives and economic considerations it is hardly 
surprising that HR practices, including appraisal, come to share those influences. 
Accompanying this is the assumption that whatever problems of measurement or evaluation 
that arise can be solved by more sophisticated methodologies (Vakkuri and Meklin, 2006). 
Issues of context, power and control are banished to the side-lines, while managers are exhorted 
to improve their techniques for evaluating performance, offering feedback and setting goals.  
The Foucauldian Critique 
The exceptions to this are the radical critiques that have questioned the neutrality of 
appraisal systems and considered issues of managerial control (Winstanley and Stuart-Smith, 
1996; Newton and Findlay, 1996), and the use of a Foucauldian analysis to assess how 
appraisals work as an exercise of power in organizations (Townley, 1993a; Wilson and Nutley, 
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2003). Foucault (1977) draws attention to hierarchical observation and systems of surveillance, 
designed to grade effort, distinguish what is ‘good’ from what is ‘bad’ and in general exert 
pressure on people to conform to behavioural, cognitive and emotional norms determined for 
them by powerful others. Building on this, Townley (1993b) explores how power is expressed 
in organizations in a relational manner. As she puts it: ‘power is not associated with a particular 
institution, but with practices, techniques, and procedures’ (p. 520). Townley discusses how 
this is manifest through a variety of HRM activities, including appraisal, and concludes that a 
Foucauldian perspective emphasizes how HRM creates knowledge and power and enables the 
HRM practitioner to associate concepts of rationality, scientificity, measurement and grading 
(Townley, 1993a, 1993b.) with HR practices. Ultimately, appraisal interviews occupy a social 
context in which a person with more power than another makes judgements about that person’s 
work, and perhaps their potential to ‘develop.’ It is, we suggest, an inherently authoritarian 
arrangement founded on what Edwards (1986) characterises as relationships of structured 
antagonism. Yet issues of power are conspicuously absent in mainstream theorising about 
appraisal3. 
Recognising this, our contribution develops Townley’s analysis. We argue that a 
Foucauldian perspective is enriched and extended if we understand that the practice of appraisal 
is located in a conceptual system largely framed through the nostrums of agency theory. Formal 
appraisal systems and interviews thus become the relational means by which agency precepts 
are routinized and institutionalised into organizational practice. Townley (1993b: 526) suggests 
that ‘HRM serves to render organisations and their participants calculable arenas, offering, 
through a variety of technologies, the means by which activities and individuals become 
knowable and governable.’ This is the context in which appraisals occur, the significance of 
                                                          
3 For example, ‘power’ is not listed in the subject index of Bennett et al’s (2006) edited book on performance 
measurement, and merits only a handful of superficial mentions in the 337 pages that constitute its text. 
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which is underestimated within most mainstream research. In utilizing the lens of agency 
theory and exploring how, as a conceptual framework, it contributes to the practice of appraisal 
we are able to illuminate how this process of rendering individuals ‘knowable’ and hence more 
‘governable’ by powerful others is manifest.  
But we also explore the relational paradoxes and tensions that this unleashes, to show 
that the attempt at governability is partial and contested has unintended outcomes that are 
actually perpetuating the well documented problems of performance appraisal. Many of the 
espoused intentions of appraisal systems prove elusive in practice precisely because the system 
produces unintended responses from those at their receiving end. These include withdrawal, 
resistance and gaming in pursuit of personal advantage. In consequence, and in a paradox that 
demonstrates the law of unintended consequences (Merton, 1936), practices that bear the 
influence of agency theory can end up increasing agency costs.  
THE INFLUENCE OF AGENCY THEORY  
Economists have long used agency theory to promote a particular understanding of the 
relationship between performance measurement systems and the provision of incentives (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). It is not without significance that Jensen and Macklin’s (1976) seminal 
paper was entitled ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership 
structure.’4 From the outset, it seems that its authors intended it as an all-encompassing 
theoretical explanation of organizations. The theory has been most often employed in research 
on the mechanisms used by owners to align the interests of CEOs with those of organizations 
(Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992). The so-called ‘principal-agent’ problem (Spencer, 2013) 
revolves around the extent to which a principal must devote effort to minimising shirking 
behaviour by an agent who is motivated by self-interest and cannot be trusted. In its own way, 
the theory thus recognises a core tenet of Critical Management Studies (CMS) - that is, that 
                                                          
4 As one measure of this paper’s influence it registered almost 60,000 citations on Google Scholar in July 2016. 
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organizations have differentiated rather than unitarist interests. But the similarity ends there. 
Agency theory explores variegated interests from the perspective of: ‘How can an organization, 
through its owners and stewards, minimise the posited tendency for managers to 
inappropriately leverage their advantage when managers’ interests are not consonant with those 
of owners?’ (Dalton et al, 2007: 2). The primacy of shareholder value and owner ‘rights’ is 
taken for granted; it is assumed that an owner’s expression of self-interest is tolerable, since it 
somehow embodies a greater good, while that of other organizational actors does not; the 
function of management systems, including appraisal, is viewed as one of aligning everyone’s 
activities with the needs of owners, rather than ensuring that owner behaviour is aligned with 
the needs of other stakeholders.  
If anything, the problem of conflicting interests within organizations has intensified. 
Davis (2009) argues that corporations are less concerned than ever with long term relationships 
and building in-house capacity with self-interest increasingly at the fore of organizational 
behaviour. Although it is sometimes acknowledged that this self-interest is ‘bounded by norms 
of reciprocity and fairness’ (Bosse and Phillips, 2016: 276), it is also assumed that ‘the interests 
of the principal and agent diverge and the principal has imperfect information about the agent’s 
contribution’ (p.276). It follows that incentives are required to narrow the gap in interests. 
Assembling more information (if necessary, through tight reporting mechanisms and close 
surveillance) is also helpful. Defenders of agency theory have argued that ‘conflicts of interest’ 
are not the same as the preponderance of self-interest, and that agents and principals have a 
variety of motives for their actions (e.g., Buchanan, 1996). Be that as it may, in practice, its 
proponents lean overwhelmingly to a narrow view of self-interest around financial calculation 
(Heath, 2009).  
This presents an imbalanced view of human behaviour, since although we may be hard 
wired to prioritise our own interests and to compete, we are also hard wired to cooperate, 
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reciprocate favours, behave altruistically and value fairness (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Nowak, 
2011), as illustrated by ‘the ultimatum game’ (Güth et al, 1982). One person with a sum of 
money (the proposer) offers it to another (the receiver) who knows how much the ‘proposer’ 
possesses. Self-interest would suggest that if the sum is $10 the proposer should offer only $1 
and that this would invariably be accepted, since the rules of the game dictate that refusal by 
the responder means both sides get nothing. Repeated studies show that in actual fact the 
proposer generally offers 50% of the sum available, and that if their offer falls below 25% it 
will most likely be rejected. Perceptions of fairness appear to trump naked financial self-
interest. Powerful group identities, forged in fire, can also find people subordinating their own 
fate and interests to the welfare of the group.5 
Regardless, agency theory assumes that in most organizations the principal’s goal is the 
promotion of shareholder value – generally held to be a good thing – while agents are assumed 
to be primarily interested in self-aggrandisement (Mansell, 2013; Angwin, 2015). In our view, 
this is a highly idealised view of the principal’s role in principal-agent relationships. 
Applebaum and Batt (2014) document predatory rent seeking behaviours by private equity 
firms that are more concerned with the short term enrichment of their funds than adding long 
term value, often destructively. In such instances the architects of corporate misfortune turn 
out to be owners rather than managers. Despite such shortcomings the theory has continued to 
acquire traction and, as we argue in this paper, become an ideological template for 
management-staff relationships within organizations. Consistent with this, there have been 
calls for agency theory to be extended beyond the economics perspective and to encompass 
                                                          
5 For example, it is often remarked that soldiers fight not for flag, king or country but for each other. The film-
maker Sebastian Junger spent five months with US soldiers in a remote part of Afghanistan. He realised, he said, 
that ‘the guys were not fighting for flag and country… They may have joined up for those sorts of reasons, but 
once they were there, they were fighting for each other and there was a completely kind of fraternal arrangement 
that had very little broad conceptual motivations behind it.’ (See https://www.rt.com/news/afghanistan-war-us-
politics/ Accessed 23rd June 2016). The seminal anti-war novel All Quiet On the Western Front, in which Erich 
Maria Remarque explores the fate of a group of German soldiers in World War One, remains one of the most 
moving depictions of this in all fiction. 
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both organizational behaviour and non-traditional settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mitnick, 1992; 
Kallifatides, 2011; Wiseman et al, 2012). This view has extended to the public sector, where 
new public management (NPM) applies the logic of agency theory in a culture of auditing, 
monitoring and appraisal (Blomgren, 2003; Ballantine et al, 2008; Craig et al, 2014). For 
example, appraisals are now commonplace in many environments where they would once have 
been disdained, including Universities, and where they reproduce some of the negative effects 
that have been well documented in the private sector (Simmons, 2002). This is not without its 
ironies. Precisely at a time when, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, the shareholder value 
model is most suspect (e.g. Davis, 2009; 2013; Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011; Stout, 2012; 
Mansell, 2013), HRM seems to be embracing it with renewed devotion. In castigating what he 
terms HR’s desire to ‘look up the organization’ Marchington (2015: 176-77) proposes that it 
has ‘become a servant to short-term performance goals and the mantra of shareholder value 
rather than the development of longer-term sustainable contributions based on shared values 
and fairness at work’.  
Thus, we suggest that agency theory has itself become an ‘agent’ within the theory and 
practice of management and has greatly influenced the concepts that managers learn during 
their formal and informal training. Pfeffer (1995) reported that the year before Jensen and 
Mecklin’s paper appeared only 2.5% of the articles published in Administrative Science 
Quarterly and 0% of the articles in Academy of Management Journal cited economics or 
economists. By 1985 these proportions had become 30% and 10%. By 1993 they had risen still 
further, to 40% and 24%. It is therefore no surprise that agency theory has now ‘diffused into 
business schools, the management literature, specialised academic and applied practitioner 
journals, the business press, even corporate proxy statements’ (Shapiro, 2005: 269). Levy and 
Williams (2004: 889) argue ‘that agency theory models have widespread implications for 
companies at both the individual and organizational level as the links between basic level 
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constructs such as goals and participation could be examined and tied to employee attitudes, 
employer-employee relationships, employee performance, organizational effectiveness and 
employee withdraw behaviors.’ These implications surely constitute one reason for its success, 
since the theory has at least the merit of offering seemingly simple prescriptions for managerial 
actions. Another is that the theory chimes with the hierarchical and power saturated nature of 
organizations and management work. It has an intuitive appeal for many, since it seems to 
merely describe ‘what is’ and which thus surely must lie beyond interrogation. As Davis (2013: 
35) puts it: ‘Thanks to two decades of restructuring driven by a quest for shareholder value the 
global supply chains of contemporary corporations increasing resemble the “nexus of 
contracts” described by the finance-based theory of the firm.’ Thus, the theory becomes 
naturalized by dint of its association with practice, and practice becomes further naturalized 
because of its association with the theory.  
Other ironies abound. Agency theory is founded on distrustful and pessimistic notions 
of human motivation and behaviour. Conceived in the first instance in terms of managerial 
behaviour and the need to align it with the interests of shareholders, it is asserted that managers 
then come to view (other) employees in the same distrustful light in which they are viewed 
themselves (Roehling et al, 2005; Thompson, 2011). Managers thus become trapped in an 
Orwellian state of Doublethink. On the one hand, they subscribe to the supportive, co-operative 
and developmental purposes of appraisal interviews (Mind-set One). On the other hand, they 
are also influenced by the more sceptical notions of agency theory (Mind-set Two). These 
contradict and undermine the positive aspirations of Mind-set One.  Such role conflict 
undermines the good intentions offered in defence of HR practices, such as performance 
appraisals.  Yet line managers primarily adopt Mind-set Two and implement HR policies with 
the primary intention of meeting cost focused performance targets (Evans, 2015). 
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We argue that this confusion represents a step backward for the HR profession and 
management more generally. Lubatkin (2005: 213) argues that agency theory makes 
assumptions ‘about the nature of individuals, organizations and markets that take the model 
out of the realm of organizational reality.’ In looking much more critically at appraisal from 
this perspective, it becomes apparent that the further adoption of an agency perspective will 
intensify the difficulties that have already been identified with how it is usually practiced rather 
than ameliorate them. We highlight these issues in Table 1, where we identify some of the 
major claims made for appraisal in the literature, show the parallel problems that have arisen 
in their practice and relate these to accompanying assumptions from agency theory that sheds 
light on the widespread nature of the problems concerned. We then focus in-depth on each of 
them in the text that follows.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
PROBLEM 1: Reliance on short term measures to assess individual employee performance  
Surveys of appraisal practice (e.g. CiPD, 2009) consistently show that ‘a results 
orientation has come to be the dominant approach for expressing performance requirements’ 
(Ward, 2005: 5). Monks et al (2012: 389) also reported a tendency in their sample for the close 
monitoring of behaviour ‘through metric-based performance management systems that focused 
on the achievement of targets… individuals were castigated for poor performance… if they 
failed to meet the performance standards required in the initial training. Reward systems were 
very closely tied to performance metrics that related to output.’ Indeed, Edwards and Wajcman 
(2006) drew the conclusion that the increased use of appraisal systems contradicts the notion 
that we have entered an era where formal bureaucracy has given way to systems built on trust 
and autonomy. Instead, they argue that it is indicative of a growth of bureaucratic control 
mechanisms, of the kind that we suggest are largely induced by an agency mentality.  
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The predominance of measureable targets and the close monitoring of employee 
achievement of such targets is, of course, aligned with agency theory assumptions, and in 
particular with the notion that economic interests are the key driver of human behaviour. It 
assumes that agents are shirkers, with a self-interest incentive to avoid work and viewed as 
‘resourceful, evaluative maximizers’ (Jensen, 1994: 1), pursuing money, respect, honour, love 
and whatever else is in their interests, while being willing to sacrifice the common good to do 
so. Agency theory’s assumption of individualistic interest is explicit. It is also aligned with 
transaction cost economics (TCE), a first cousin of agency theory (see Williamson, 1979). In 
Ghoshal’s words (2006: 14) TCE ‘assumes that individuals are self-interested and 
opportunistic in nature, and they will cheat the system if they can.’ In this world view, 
departures from self-interest are irrational, aberrational and, ultimately, inexplicable. Shirking 
is therefore inevitable (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006). On the other hand, the principal is motivated 
to ensure that no shirking occurs. But it is often the case that the principal cannot be sure if 
agents have applied maximum effort in pursuit of the goals and tasks to which they have been 
directed (Holstrom, 1979). It follows that surveillance and tighter supervision is required. The 
tension here is between allowing agents an element of discretion – often the reason that they 
are chosen as agents in the first place, particularly when the principal is unsure of what their 
precise interests or objectives will be (Hendry, 2002), or counter-productively eliminating the 
scope for such discretion by tight specification and close monitoring. Either variant is liable to 
incur agency costs, creating an irresolvable paradox (Shapiro, In Press). Regardless, 
organizations often attempt to overcome this paradox via a Sisyphean default to complex 
incentive and performance management/ appraisal systems that make full use of hierarchical 
authority (Monks et al, 2012).  
This reinforces short term measures of financial performance, since these are viewed 
as capturing the primary purpose of organizational activity. Organizations become viewed as 
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‘simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310). This contributes to a focus on the most 
immediately visible and quantifiable aspects of performance, thus undermining the opportunity 
to identify longer term employee development and performance needs (Antonsen, 2014).  
Relationships and the long term view of behaviour 
Yet relationships (and organizations) develop over time. Such issues as fairness and 
equity are central to how most people, in reality, view their relationships and evaluate their 
working environment (Pepper et al, 2015). But the short term nature of performance appraisal, 
with its focus on annual reviews, means that such relationships are difficult to both nurture and 
measure (Tourish, 2006). In addition, the focus on past performance and measureable targets 
is inconsistent with long term performance indicators (Bach, 2005). The data in Monks et al’s 
study (2012: 390) also highlights this issue, finding that the performance management and 
monitoring systems that they investigated ‘encouraged competition between employees.’ This 
leads to tension between short term and long term perspectives on performance. Short termism 
arises because of the lack of congruence between the time when people are appraised and those 
activities that yield long-term benefits to organizations. In turn, this limits the ability of 
performance appraisal to facilitate long term, sustainable performance from employees. 
Appraisals designed in this way teach people to focus their efforts only on those aspects of 
performance likely to be recognised and rewarded during the appraisal process, even if these 
prove to be ultimately detrimental to improved performance and sustainability (Pfeffer and 
Sutton, 2006; Antonsen, 2013).  
Additionally, performance levels deteriorate over time when the emphasis shifts from 
intrinsic motivation to the gaining of tangible short term targets (Kohn, 1993). This is because 
long term indicators of performance incur immediate costs, such as training and development. 
The benefits may not show up until after many years (Goddard et al, 2000), or may remain 
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unknown (Smith, 1993). To this extent, a heavy stress on measureable performance indicators 
during appraisal interviews, in line with the precepts of agency theory, is liable to increase 
extensive or constrained effort at the expense of discretionary effort. No wonder that 
performance appraisals have been criticised for the conflicting nature of their purposes and a 
resultant failure to improve employee performance on any sustainable basis (Marsden, 2010).  
We argue that appraisals are therefore implicated in destructive self-fulfilling 
prophecies. They are implemented, at least partly, to monitor and limit shirking behaviour. But 
they risk reducing the intrinsic motivation so important for more and more occupations. The 
very behaviour that the system is seeking to prevent can then become entrenched – reduced 
effort, and poorer performance. It is, of course, likely that this will produce a heightened 
commitment to surveillance on the part of managers rather than a realisation that the monitoring 
induced by an agency influenced mind-set is itself part of the problem. 
PROBLEM 2: Developmental feedback undermined by relating appraisal to pay and a close 
scrutiny of performance 
Many performance appraisal systems attempt to serve both administrative purposes and 
the developmental and learning needs of employees (Kondrasuk, 2012). But, driven by 
administrative imperatives (two for one, anyone?) and agency assumptions that immediate self-
interest and tangible rewards are what most motivate people, organizations also use appraisal 
systems to determine pay increases. In the UK, the proportion of organizations linking pay to 
appraisal outcomes in this way rose from 15% in 2004 to 24% in 2011 (Van Wanrooy et al, 
2013). The practice has also become more prevalent in the public sector (Ballantine et al, 2008). 
However, appraisals are simultaneously expected to address developmental goals associated 
with helping employees to improve their individual and collective job performance. As 
McGregor (1957) complained, this requires managers to play God. Employees grow reluctant 
to openly discuss performance problems, since it may damage their pay and career prospects. 
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This reluctance undermines the developmental, learning and supportive intentions purportedly 
associated with performance appraisal, and which depends on trust and open two-way 
communication for their realisation.  
Linking appraisal to pay and attendant tight supervision is consistent with the 
predominant agency theory assumption that there is no such thing as non-pecuniary agent 
motivation, or that if there is it is insignificant (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). The assumption is 
that people could work more effectively, efficiently and smartly if they wanted to, but will 
usually choose not to. Consequently, close monitoring, regular feedback and complex systems 
of rewards and punishments are required to compensate for their deficit of motivation. This 
approach tends to undermine the developmental intentions that are generally held to be 
appraisal’s primary purpose. Thus, the evidence suggests that performance related pay linked 
to appraisals does little to actually improve employee performance (Kennedy and Dresser, 
2001), that it demotivates staff (Smith and Rupp, 2003), does not help retain high performers 
or encourage poor performers to leave, and that it creates perceptions of unfairness (Varma and 
Stroh, 2001).  
None of this should be a surprise. Studies of motivation have long suggested that close 
monitoring of behaviour and performance related pay reduces the intrinsic motivation so 
crucial to much modern work (Deci, 1999; Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Once a premium on 
rewards is installed people become less willing to engage in any form of work related activity 
without them, however poor the resultant quality or their own lack of interest in the outcome6. 
The use of appraisal is in danger of producing further negative self-fulfilling prophecies, in that 
managers are encouraged to believe employees will only put in an effort if pay is closely linked 
to the effort required; employees become more distant and disengaged from any intrinsic 
                                                          
6 The problem goes even deeper than this. A fascinating study by Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) looked at the 
willingness of Swiss citizens to support the building of a nuclear power facility in their area. They found that 
when (extrinsic) financial incentives were offered the proportion of people willing to do so declined. There are 
lessons in this for organizations who attempt to link every instance of pro-social behaviour to money. 
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investment in the effort in question; and, managers become even more convinced that it is only 
through such rewards that employees will do anything, since they are ever more inclined to 
demand more money and neglect those tasks not directly related to pay progression. As so 
often, McGregor (1960: 41-42) anticipated this argument. He observed that when managers 
focus on money people respond by demanding more of it. They will also ‘behave exactly as 
we might predict – with indolence, passivity, unwillingness to accept responsibility, resistance 
to change, willingness to follow the demagogue, unreasonable demands for economic benefits. 
It seems that we may be caught in a web of our own weaving.’ Among its other effects, it 
appears that agency theory has erased the memories of those who research, teach and practice 
management, condemning them to forever reinvent the wheel but immediately forget that they 
have just done so. 
Appraisal and ‘differentiation’ 
Similar misbegotten and forgetful dynamics are evident when performance appraisal 
systems are linked to what is described as ‘differentiation’ or ‘forced distribution systems.’ 
Many companies have used differentiation in their appraisal schemes, including General 
Electric, IBM, Railtrack, Kimberley-Clark and the Royal Bank of Scotland7. It has sometimes 
been termed ‘rank and yank.’ Within such systems, a designated percentage of employees are 
classed as failing to the point whereby they may ultimately be targeted for redundancy. Others 
are rated as ‘high performers’ who receive generous levels of reward. Still others are viewed 
as ‘average’ who need to improve if they are to avert further downgrading. Such systems 
compel employees to behave in the self-interested manner predicted by agency theory (and 
transaction cost economics), since it becomes in everyone’s interest to make some else look 
bad rather than themselves. In that way, they can hope to safeguard their position a little longer. 
                                                          
7 It is significant that many, including General Electric, have now abandoned differentiation entirely.  
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No wonder that people generally perceive such a system to be the least fair system of appraisal 
(Roche et al, 2007).  
Moreover, as highlighted in Table 1, it privileges the management voice over others in 
determining goals, rewards and training needs. Yet research has found that raters also find such 
systems more difficult to implement and less fair than traditional formats (Schleicher, 2009). 
Interestingly, Enron also based its performance management systems on precisely this 
approach8. Management power over employees was intensified. People became so concerned 
with the prospect of being classified in the bottom category that they muted all criticism of 
management action (Tourish and Vatcha, 2005). The resulting culture, of high conformity, 
compliance with toxic management systems and lax ethical practice, led to disaster. While 
formal appraisal schemes are intended as one of the main tools for dealing with the problem of 
shirking and sub-optimisation assumed in the agency perspective (Goddard et al, 2000), in 
practice their side effects have the capacity to undermine whatever putatively positive 
intentions are expressed. 
Managers are thus placed in an ever more paradoxical position, thereby increasing their 
feelings of role conflict. They are required to devote greater effort to the monitoring and 
management of performance. Yet such systems discourage open reflection on performance 
problems (without which no learning takes place), reduce intrinsic motivation and encourage 
people to project an exaggerated image of their work efficacy, even as that efficacy is put under 
threat. A vicious cycle emerges. Managers react to reduced intrinsic motivation by defaulting 
to ‘hard’ HRM approaches in the implementation of practices such as appraisal (Evans, 2015). 
As these produce yet more unintended consequences, they then become ever more critical of 
                                                          
8 Enron may be fast receding into history, but its bankruptcy in 2001 was at the time the biggest in US corporate 
history. It subsequently emerged that its ‘profits’ were mostly based on accounting fraud.  
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the shirking, gaming employees that have been produced by systems at least partly designed to 
minimise precisely these behaviours.  
PROBLEM 3: Prioritisation of individual rather than team performance 
There has been growing acknowledgement of the multiplicity of relationships that form 
complex organizational structures and the value of a stewardship approach in such a context 
(Roberson et al, 2007). Despite this, the majority of performance appraisals are conducted on 
an individual basis, while individual merit pay raises and bonuses are the most common form 
of performance related pay (CIPD, 2009). These approaches mirror the notion that individual 
self-interest invariably trumps concern for the collective (Sen, 1977).  
Yet systems thinkers argue that emphasising individual performance and self-interest 
at the exclusion of team performance results in an ineffective system (Seddon, 2008). It is 
difficult to reconcile team responsibility and commitments with an emphasis on individual 
responsibility. The encouragement of self-interest, through a stress on individual effort, also 
incentivizes employees to cover up errors and inflate claims for their own performance, 
potentially at the expense of team performance. This negates efforts to promote organizational 
learning capability, despite its claimed potential to make a positive contribution to organization 
performance (Camps and Luna-Arocas, 2012).  
We offer an example here that may resonate with many readers. Targets for research 
income have been introduced at one in six UK universities, at either individual or departmental 
level (Jump, 2015). However, the UK based ESRC’s annual report for 2014-15 disclosed that 
only one of 21 open call business and management applications secured funding. In short, 
success or failure depends to some significant extent on factors beyond the control of the 
applicant. Paradoxically, the more academics who apply for funding – driven by targets – the 
lower their chances of success will be. This is a zero sum game. But they are still liable to be 
‘performance managed’ if they fail to achieve their targets. Perversely, the process of appraisal 
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can encourage managers to see problems created by systems as evidence of individual 
weaknesses that must be ‘managed.’ They therefore promote an ever more individualistic 
approach to how academics are managed and how they work. In a further instance of 
managerial amnesia, Deming (1982) warned against appraisal systems decades ago on the basis 
that they had precisely these perverse effects.  
Even where appraisals have been designed around team working principles it has been 
found that issues of individual gaming are still prevalent while team working relationships are 
not necessarily enhanced (Toegel and Conger, 2003). Appraisal processes founded on 
principles of maximised performance and measureable objectives tend to ‘be self-serving, 
irrespective of any inclusive, team-working rhetoric’ (Tourish et al, 2010: 53). Once more, 
employee-manager relationships are shunted onto a track consistent with agency theory, and 
away from building trust, loyalty and reciprocity. The benefits of this are not immediately 
obvious. 
PROBLEM 4: Difficulty of accurately and objectively measuring performance 
Ultimately, the developmental and supportive intentions behind appraisal systems that 
are routinely articulated in the literature rest on the assumption that assessment methods can 
measure employee performance with reasonable accuracy. Evan scholars who advocate 
appraisals and the use of financial incentives within them admit that performance measures of 
appraisals must be both complete and accurate. Otherwise, they ‘lead to undesired behaviours’ 
(Shaw and Gupta, 2015: 288). Agency notions that people should be closely monitored rest on 
the same assumption, since it is imagined that such supervision yields a more or less accurate 
impression of people’s work effort. This is questionable on two main grounds. Firstly, some 
research into the accuracy of what are known as frequency based assessments of behaviour in 
garment manufacturing plants compared estimated and actual frequencies of behaviours on the 
part of sewing machine operators (Deadrick and Gardner, 1997). The authors report a 
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correlation of .59. Given a sample size of 397, this was statistically significant. However, the 
effect size is small. These data would appear to suggest that even when tangible and repetitious 
tasks are at the heart of a job it is difficult to estimate people’s behaviour, no matter how closely 
they are observed. The more intangible the effort in question the harder this will be. Moreover, 
the effects of close monitoring on job satisfaction, commitment and intrinsic motivation are 
unlikely to be positive. 
Secondly, a problem arises here from the effects of the moral hazard assumption of 
agency theory on the accuracy of our perceptions. The idea of moral hazard suggests that people 
will take risks or avoid effort if they imagine that the costs of doing so will be borne by others, 
such as employers rather than employees (Dembe and Boden, 2000). This is obviously often 
true, as in the banking crisis: in this instance, as in others, there clearly are principal-agent 
issues to be addressed. But moral hazard does not invariably prevail, particularly in a context 
of deeply embedded and long term relationships between people. Regardless of this 
qualification, the notion of moral hazard is generally taken to imply that employees should be 
closely scrutinized. Typical of many, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) devote a chapter of a book 
tellingly entitled ‘Economics, Organization and Management’ to employee retention strategies. 
As Heath (2009: 501) critically notes, they don’t ‘once mention the fact that employees 
sometimes feel a sense of loyalty to the firm (and that managers have it within their power to 
cultivate such loyalties).’ A predominantly economic perspective informs project scrutiny, 
born of the fear of deviance, which is in turn facilitated by traditional appraisals. This has 
encouraged firms to a focus on tangible inputs and outputs, at the expense of more subjective 
measures of performance, often with unintended consequences (Shaw and Gupta, 2015). 
However, behaviours that are not easily observed may offer more important indicators of 
effectiveness, particularly in knowledge oriented and creative workplaces such as universities. 
Context-oriented behaviours such as organizational citizenship behaviour, pro-social 
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organizational behaviour or extra-role behaviour are often intangible, and not easily captured 
within a performance appraisal process (Organ et al, 2006). Appraisers seeking to form an 
overall judgement of performance must therefore default to other criteria, or resort to the 
perceptual biases with which all of us are fully equipped (Hoffman et al., 2010). 
Thus, the focus on what is ‘measureable’ and hence observable supports agency 
theory’s assumption of widespread and inevitable employee shirking, its inclination to 
disregard the multi-dimensional nature of effort and the distinctive impact different types of 
effort can have on performance. The ability of managers to make sound and fair judgements of 
all facets of employee performance becomes progressively more difficult (Wilson, 2010). Such 
systems shift managers’ emphasis away from creating meaning and purpose and towards a 
micro-management of efforts that, despite being highly visible, may be much less important 
for longer term success than their visibility assumes. What happens back stage is as vital as 
what happens on stage in the production of a compelling performance.  
A further difficulty from the standpoint of moral hazard is determining precisely what 
employees have done, and hence the extent of their contribution to organizational success or 
failure. Complex organizational structures create multiple priorities, conflicting instructions 
and a proliferation of targets. Spans of control and long-distance appraisals in multi-national 
corporations makes the principal agent relationship and close monitoring of performance 
subject to more errors (Holmstrom, 1982). As a result, appraisal interviews permit managers, 
who perhaps know less and less about an individual’s work, to determine which aspects of their 
performance are to be evaluated, as well as to decide the consequences of the measurement, 
including pay and career progression. Consequently, the context of performance may be lost, 
despite its importance for the ability of any appraisal scheme to even partially achieve its 
objectives (Farr and Levy, 2004). However, the need for decisiveness (e.g. when appraisal 
schemes involve a rating scale) encourages an attitude of certainty towards evaluations when 
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they are objectively uncertain. This makes it difficult to deliver cogent, well informed 
assessments of the performance of others – the very thing on which the whole system depends. 
The reliance on agency assumptions in the design of many appraisals increase the likelihood 
of managers becoming suspicious monitors of only objective measures of behaviour. In turn, 
organisations are in danger of alienating their employees through such approaches with a recent 
survey finding almost a third of employees believe that their current performance management 
systems are unfair (CIPD, 2014). 
PROBLEM 5: Self-efficacy biases cause employees to have more favourable view of 
performance than their managers do 
Most people do not rate their own performance as either average or below average. 
Rather, they exaggerate their contribution to organizational success (Rollinson and Broadfield, 
2002). This is important, since it suggests that an employee’s evaluation of their performance 
may differ from that of the manager charged with conducting an appraisal interview.  
Here, agency theory once more comes into play. We have already noted that it suggests 
employees must be closely monitored since they will otherwise deviate from organizational 
goals. This in turn effects how their performance is perceived. Some experimental work 
suggests that the more managers monitor performance the more likely they are to value the end 
product highly, since they have a strong belief in their own efficacy and hence on whatever 
they attribute to be the outcome of their actions (Pfeffer and Cialdini, 1998). However, this 
does not necessarily translate into an appreciation of the contribution that employees have made 
to such outcomes. While the evidence on this point is mixed, and beyond the scope of our paper 
to fully evaluate, there is some to suggest that the greater a person’s power over others the less 
likely they are to interact with them and the less favourable the evaluations of their performance 
will be (Kipnis, 1972). After all, it can be reasoned, if they were really good at their job they 
would not require such close supervision in the first place.  
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These problems are compounded by performance related pay. An experimental 
simulation study led those in the role of supervisors to falsely believe that those whose work 
they were overseeing were either enjoying what they did (Intrinsic Motivation) or, 
alternatively, doing it only for money (Extrinsic Motivation). When they believed that money 
was the driver of performance the supervisors responded by becoming more controlling. In 
turn, ‘employees’ in the study became more disinterested in the task. The flipside was also 
observed, in that those in the ‘intrinsic motivation’ condition chose to spend significantly more 
of their free time on the task (Pelletier et al, 1996). As Ghoshal (2006: 24) summarised: 
‘Because all behaviour (especially that which is consistent with management’s objectives) is 
seen by management as motivated by the controls in place, managers develop a jaundiced view 
of their subordinates.’ This does not displace their confidence that these judgements are 
accurate, even as they diverge from those of the employees in question.  
In addition, if managers imagine that the work produced under close supervision is of 
higher quality than that which is less closely monitored (what Pfeffer and Cialdini (1998) call 
‘the illusion of influence’), and that employees have therefore performed well, it follows that 
ever tighter monitoring would confer even more benefits. Thus, good performance may be seen 
as occurring in spite of the attributes of the person involved. Their successes can instead be 
credited to the system of surveillance which, it is imagined, has reigned in their tendency to 
behave deviantly. In addition, to the harmful effects of this on intrinsic motivation and the 
quality of work, there is the obvious risk that ever tighter monitoring becomes a form of ‘petty 
tyranny’, and so triggers low self-esteem, damages performance, weakens work unit 
cohesiveness, and produces higher levels of frustration, stress, reactance, helplessness, and 
work alienation (Ashforth, 1994), all of which undermine people’s capacity to learn. 
Of course, these are not the only problems here. But we are stressing those that arise 
from close supervision, driven by agency theory reasoning, and its ensuing negative impact on 
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managers’ perceptions of the work of others. In aggregate, it means that during formal appraisal 
interviews managers can be reduced to informing employees that their performance is weaker 
than what they themselves imagine it to be. Even if attempts are made to ‘compensate’ for this 
by also providing positive feedback, a great deal of research has shown that ‘bad’ events, such 
as critical feedback, are much more powerful and memorable than those events regarded as 
good (Baumeister et al, 2001). Consistent with this, in the context of appraisal, DeNisi (1996) 
found that 75 per cent of employees saw the evaluations they received as less favourable than 
their own self-estimates and therefore regarded appraisal interviews as a deflating experience. 
The numerous biases that managers themselves bring to the process of appraisal intensify this 
problem. 
In line with the anxieties voiced by Ghoshal (2005) and Pfeffer (2005), these outcomes 
may well activate a large number of destructive self-fulfilling prophecies, whereby negative 
feedback creates resentment, places obstacles in the path of personal development and 
diminishes rather than enhances effectiveness. It equates to an instrumentalist view of the 
employment relationship whereby employees are viewed as a ‘resource’ to be employed or 
discarded on the basis of their short-term performance (Tourish et al, 2010). Moreover, close 
monitoring exacerbates the power relationships existent in traditional organizational 
hierarchies and endorsed by agency theory. Such a context only highlights the pervasive 
influence of agency relationships in the appraisal process and the role they play in maintaining 
structural power inequalities between managers and employees. Overall, it supports the 
conclusion that the (mal)practice of performance appraisal is intimately informed by the 
assumptions of agency theory, and constitutes a further example of how this theory leads to 




While advice for practitioners on how to ‘improve’ appraisal is plentiful, it is clear that 
the ‘creation of a successful performance appraisal system remains largely an unrealised goal’ 
(Gordon and Stewart, 2009: 274). In problematizing conventional perspectives on this issue, 
we argue that agency theory has influenced the implementation of performance appraisals, by 
virtue of the deeper traction it exerts within management theory and hence on the ideological 
context in which management is practiced. We have argued that dominant assumptions within 
agency theory of economic rationality, self-interest and moral hazard have a negative impact 
on how performance appraisal systems are misused in many organizations. In doing so, we 
suggest that appraisals constitute a prime example of how a theory can damage learning and 
contribute to bad management practice. Their continued popularity is a classic instance of hope 
triumphing over experience. It owes little to any inherent utility. We therefore extend 
Foucauldian approaches by showing how agency theory perpetuates particular forms of power 
relationships in organizations, enacted through often questioned but astonishingly resilient HR 
practices, such as appraisals. The very ubiquity of appraisals has given them a ‘naturalised’ 
status in the minds, lexicon and practices of managers and researchers, even as their actual 
effects are frequently deplored. 
Managers are often only too well aware of these issues, but face two key problems in 
addressing them. Firstly, as Mintzberg (2009) has reminded us, management work is 
unrelenting, orientated to action, fragmented, and full of interruptions. The time for reflection, 
including reading, is minimal. No wonder that folklore, tradition and the casual imitation of 
what others do frequently triumphs over a careful study of the evidence (Pfeffer and Sutton, 
2006). Secondly, managers are encouraged to keep hoping that things will improve. Key texts 
promoted by business schools recognise that ‘good intentions in the PA area have often been 
associated with disappointing outcomes’ (Boxall and Purcell, 2003: 145), but still go on to 
assume that adjustments will enable managers to ensure that ‘formal PA systems reach more 
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of their potential’ (p.146). The problem is that each such fix has unintended consequences. 
Keen to ease their pain, managers look for yet more fixes. And they have an eager supplier - in 
the form of the HR industry. In contrast, our article denaturalizes appraisals. We seek to situate 
debate on the issue in a deeper appreciation of the power saturated and ideological contexts in 
which they are implemented. This suggests that the more formalised, ritualised, and 
bureaucratised the process of appraisal becomes the less helpful and more damaging it is likely 
to be. Perhaps it useful to recall the injunction of the Hippocratic School: ‘First, do no harm.’ 
If appraisals risk doing more harm than good perhaps we should suggest abolishing them - 
surely, by now, there have been enough attempts to fix the unfixable? 
What is the alternative? 
Of course, this begs the question: what is the alternative? In briefly canvassing this 
issue it is worth noting that our scepticism about the value of appraisals is becoming more 
widely shared in the corporate world. Accenture, a global consulting firm with over 330000 
employees, conducted an internal review which concluded that the time, money and effort spent 
on them did not produce better performance among employees. It decided to abandon the 
annual appraisal interview altogether9. Burkus (2016) details many similar initiatives. For 
example, Adobe calculated that managers spent 80,000 hours a year conducting annual 
performance reviews, to little positive effect. They replaced the annual review with a less 
formal and more frequent ‘check in’ process. Microsoft has abolished ratings of performance 
and a ranking system that emulated the forced curve ranking so beloved by General Electric’s 
Jack Welch. In 2010, the Lear Corporation also abolished annual appraisals and replaced them 
with quarterly feedback discussions between managers and employees.  
                                                          
9 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/07/21/in-big-move-accenture-will-get-rid-
of-annual-performance-reviews-and-rankings/. Accessed 5th September 2015. 
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These initiatives are welcome. The less formality and paperwork that is involved the 
less likely everyone is to feel overwhelmed by bureaucratic mechanisms devoted to monitoring, 
grading, ranking, rewarding and firing. But whether the supposedly more informal and ongoing 
discussions that seem intended to replace them will prove any better remains to be seen. The 
main problem we have highlighted is the extent to which agency theory, through management 
discourse, has become part of institutional logic and an ideology that underpins, and 
subsequently damages, staff-management relationships. Ultimately, the key to progress must 
lie in challenging those theories of human behaviour that lead managers astray and infect the 
good intentions of practices such as performance appraisals.  Until the assumptions of agency 
theory are challenged more directly in both the teaching in business schools and the practices 
of organizations, then a successful appraisal scheme is unattainable.  
How likely is this? Davis (In Press) points out that the number of shareholder 
corporations has fallen by over half in the past decade, at least in the US. Small scale production 
technologies are emerging that facilitate different forms of organizing. As he argues: ‘While 
corporations are basic units of production in many theories about the economy, they should be 
regarded as only one hypothesis about how production is and can be organized.’ Theories 
(agency theory) based on the study of publicly traded corporations, and long standing practices 
also modelled on behemoth corporations, should not be regarded as immutable. As the world 
around us changes so should our theories and our practices. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, we return to Ghoshal (2006: 42). He advocated an alternative perspective 
which recognizes that: ‘…the advantage of organizations over markets may lie not in 
overcoming human pathologies through hierarchy, but in leveraging the human ability to take 
initiative, to cooperate, and to learn; it may also rely on exploiting the organization’s 
internalised purpose and diversity to enhance both learning and its use in creating purposeful 
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and innovative adaptation.’ We do not question the value of regular, informal communication 
and two-way feedback. But, to be effective, these need to be informed by different values, 
based on trust and a diminution of power differentials within the workplace. By contrast, 
conventional appraisals prioritise hierarchy over intrinsic motivation, distrust over trust, and 
the importance of individual effort over that of building sustainable, co-operative systems. 
Without a major rethink along the lines advocated in this paper they will continue to blight 
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